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STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY VERCIMAK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, I 
vs. 
ADAM OSTOICH. \ 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts is neither fully 
accurate nor complete in the following particulars: 
Defendant, at page 2 of his brief, quotes the 
amended complaint that defendant refused to 
adjust and settle all differences and claims of the 
plaintiff, except that defendant paid to the plaintiff'\ 
plaintiff's share of the profits earned from said busi-
ness to and including the 12th day of February, 1948, 
in the sum of $318. 79'1 \Yhereas the allegation is "that 
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defendant has refused to adjust and settle all differ-
ences and claims of the plaintiff except that defend-
ant paid to the plaintiff the plaintiff's share of the 
profits earned to and including the 12th day of 
February, 1948, and in addition thereto, the sum of 
$318.79 as a partial settlE-ment of plaintiff's claims 
CTr. p. 9). 
ThC're 1s no evidence to support defendant's 
allegation (Appellant's brief p. 3) that plaintiff vio-
lated any conditions of the oral agreement and failed 
to devote his time and energy to the business. En-
deavoring to show misconduct by plaintiff~ defendant 
by his o-wn testimony and the testimony of his wife 
endeavored to convince the trial court that plaintiff 
had been drinking on the job and despite complete 
failure to do so is nevertheless still referring to it and 
1nakes at least two references to plaintiff's drinking 
in defendant's statement of facts (Appellant's brief 
pp. 6-7). An examination of defendant's and dE--
fendant's 'vife's testimony and the testimony of other 
witnesses clearly reveals the falsity of defendant's 
contention that plaintiff had been drinking on the 
job. Both plaintiff and Dancel Vercimak, his wife, 
testified plaintiff did not drink on the job (Tr. pp. 
118, 119, 113) and both testified plaintiff did not so 
much as have a State of Utah liquor permit (Tr. pp. 
T5, 76, 113, 120). Plaintiff also testified that he and 
the defendant had never discussed his drinking on 
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the job ~ Tr. p. 7:3). Defendant was unable to pro-
duce a single independent \Yitness to testify that 
plaintiff drank whiskey. Since defendant apparently 
relies so much upon the point, one "vonders vvhy he 
did not produce \Yitnesses other than himself and his 
\Yife to testify regarding his claim of plaintiff's drink-
ing. On cross examination plaintiff \Vas asked by 
defendant's attorney if he had ever taken a drink 
'vith 1Y1r. Fairbanks, who was one of defendant's 
'vitnesses CTr. p. 120), to \'\'hich plaintiff answered, 
"'No, sir". Defendant's witness, Mr. Fairbanks, on 
direct examination, denied ever having drunk even 
so much as a glass of beer with the plaintiff (Tr. p. 
165), and on cross examination further stated that 
from his observations the plaintiff conducted himself 
properly and that he "Vvouldn't say more than he had 
seen plaintiff take a drink of beer a couple of times 
CTr. p. 166). Josephine Bowen, who frequented the 
Horseshoe Inn, testified she had never seen the plain-
tiff take a drink and that she had never seen him 
drunk (Tr. p. 122). Her testimony was not that she 
was in the Horseshoe Inn occasionally as stated in de-
fendant's statement of facts (Appellant's brief p. 7), 
but that she 'vas in the place ~'almost ever~r night" 
(Tr. p. 124). 
Defendant states that "plaintiff also suggested go-
ing into the grocery business but defendant told him 
he would not be interested in that'' (Appellant's 
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brief p. I· J. The fact is that defendant suggested a 
grocery business and that plaintiff told defendant he 
wouldn't be interested (Tr. p. 65). 
DefPndant testified the Horseshoe Inn opened for 
business December 14, 1947, (Tr. p. 99), and plain-
tiff alleged in paragraph 4 of his amended complaint 
that the business opened to the public December 13, 
1947, (Tr. p. 8), and in this connection compare ap-
pellant's brief, page 5. 
\Yith reference to defendant's claims that he 
thought full settlement had been effected (Appel-
lant's brief p. 6) defendant admitted on cross exam-
ination that he knew plaintiff claimed more than 
his share of the profits and inventory (Tr. p. 107). 
Also defendant's tendering two receipts, one for 
share of receipts, defendant's Exhibit 2, and the 
other for share of stock, defendant's Exhibit 1, and 
the circumstances under which they were given 
clearly indicated a final settlement was not intended 
in connection therewith by either defendant or plain-
tiff (Tr. pp. 106-107). 
Defendant refers to plaintiff's contention that 
the business made profits of $750.00 per month and 
that plaintiff admitted on cross examination the pro-
fit for December was only $380.00 (Appellant's brief 
p. 7). Of course, the business opened December 13, 
1947, (Tr. p. 8, 99) and the profit for December was, 
therefore, for only one-half month's operations. 
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At the tin1e of the negotiations for entering in to 
the partnership, the plaintiff \Yas gainfully employed 
in Rock Springs, 'Vyoming (Tr. pp. 64, 73, 74, 138) 
and the plaintiff \Yas not disposed to enter into busi-
ness vvith the defendant vdthout some assurance of a 
reasonable duration (Tr. p. 64). The defendant 
requested the plaintiff to enter into the partnership 
CTr. p. 64) and to do so the plaintiff necessarily had 
to leave his gainful employment in Wyoming and es-
tablish his residence in Murray, Utah. The defend-
ant \Yas plaintiff's uncle and naturally plaintiff 
placed confidence and trust in him which accounts 
for plaintiff not insisting on a \vritten agreement in 
the first instance. Plaintiff_'s leaving his employ-
ment and expense of moving in order to enter into 
the partnership, together vvith plaintiff's initial con-
tribution in labor in preparing the premises (Tr. pp. 
136-137) at least offset defendant's claimed $2400.00 
investment (Tr. p. 201). Also plaintiff's payment 
to defendant of $100.00 per month (Tr. pp. 60, 61, 
R1) during the term would have in two years fully 
reimbursed defendant for his investment, and of 
\Yhich the plaintiff paid for two months totaling 
$200.00. The plaintiff loaned to defendant $250.00 
or $300.00 initial operating expenses (Tr. pp. 8, 101). 
The bE'er license was taken out in plaintiff's name 
(Tr. p. 98). The contributions to the partnership 
w0re not~ therefore, one-sided in favor of the defend-
ant. 
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6 
There was considerable competent testimony as 
to the value of the business. Plaintiff, Josephine 
Bowen, defendant's witness John B. Fairbanks, Sam-
uel L. Tedesco, Reed Van Quill and defendant's wit-
ness Harold Leonard all gave testimony relating to 
the value of the business. 
Defendant makes much over the fact that plain-
tiff did not have a lease which, of course, is imma-
terial since the defendant was a partner with the 
plaintiff and owned the premises and continued to 
operate and to profit after February 12, 1948, from 
the value of the business established by the joint 
efforts of the partners. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES A 
CAUSE OF ACTION. 
In his amended complaint, plaintiff in orrlinary 
and concise language alleges that the partners had 
created a business reasonable worth $15,000.00, of 
\Vhich the defendant should be required to pay him 
one-half thereof, and alleging that the defendant 
continued to operate the business and that the rle-
fendant "has unjustly benefited and accrued to him-
self and is using for his own purposes the said busi-
ness of the parties of the reasonable value of $1.J.-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
000.00" (Tr. p. 9). It is clear from a reading of the 
complaint that all plaintiff claimed was settlement 
for his share of the value of the going business de-
veloped from the joint efforts of the parties. 
Section 104-7-2 (2) Utah Code Annotated 1943, 
provides: 
'"The complaint must contain: (2) A 
statement of the facts constituting a cause of 
action in ordinary and concise language." 
Graham v. Street., 109 Utah 460; 166 Pac. (2d) 
524 at page 526: 
"It is not necessary to designate the type 
of action." 
Campbellz'. Taylor, 3 lJtah 32:J; 3 Pac. 44;): 
'~A complaint need allege no more than 
will constitute prima facie a cause of action or 
defense." 
Geros v. Harries, 65 Utah 227; 236 Pac. 220; 39 
A.L.R. 1297: 
"In determining sufficiency of allegations 
of complaint, one must not have recourse to 
only certain parts of complaint, but must de-
termine effect that should be given to com-
plaint when considererl as a whole." 
The partnership business as such having a value 
which was not divided between the partners, the 
plaintiff is entitled to his proportionate share in cash. 
(See Section 69-1-35 ( 1) lJtah Code Annotated 
1 q41.) 
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~- THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS FINDING 
THAT THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 
WAS BREACHED BY THE DEFENDANT. 
Appellant in his brief throughout makes con-
stant reference to the proposed written partnership 
agreement which the plaintiff had his attorney pre-
pare and· present to the defendant for signing but 
\'vhich the defendant would not sign, discuss or make 
any recommendations (Tr. p. 78). Why didn't the 
defendant sign the agreement? Was it because it 
did not provide for a term of 5 years? It is apparent 
that defendant did not, after the business had com-
menced operations and its value vvas apparent, in-
tend to sign any vvritten agreement of partnership. 
It is fair to say that the defendant thought he savv an 
opportunity to take the value of the business for 
himself ·without having to share vvith the plaintiff 
and refused to enter into a written agreement (Tr. 
p. 6 7), or to continue in partnership with plaintiff 
CTr. pp. 71-72). 
Even though no definite time for the partner-
ship term vvas agreed upon, a reasonable time should 
be implied and what would constitute a reasonable 
time vvould depend upon all the circumstances of the 
particular case. In this connection and as before dis-
cussed in plaintiff's and appellant's statement of facts 
herein. plaintiff vvas induced by defendant in order 
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to enter the partnership to leave gainful ernployment 
in \Vyoming, contribute at least five weeks labor in 
preparing the premises before opening to the public, 
to bear the expense of Inoving from Wyoming to 
Utah, and the be('r license was secured in the plain-
tiff's name. Certainly these circumstances would 
not imply a t\YO months operation period for the 
partnership term, nor justify defendant's refusal to 
continue the partnership or to permit plaintiff on the 
premises for the purpose of operating the partnership 
at the end of t"vo n1onths operations, that is, on Feb-
ruary 12, 1948, and the defendant, therefore, in re-
fusing under the circumstances to go on with the 
partnership, breached the partnership agreement as 
alleged in plaintiff's complaint. 
For the purpose_ of argument and illustration, 
assurnc that there had been no breach of partnership 
agreement by the defendant and that the partner-
ship had continued to function and operate for the 
extended term of say five years and that at the end 
of five ) e3rs the value of the then going busi,~ess \Vas 
reasonably \vorth $10,000.00. Would the defendant 
have been entitled to keep the value of the business 
and to continue operating the same without com-
pensating plaintiff for his share as a partner thereof? 
3. TI-TERE WAS NOT A COMPLETE SETTLE-
MENT AND SATISFACTION BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
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10 
Defendant vYcll knew the plaintiff claimed n1ore 
than plaintiff's share of inventory and profits to Feb-
ruary 12, 1948, as plaintiff's share of the business and 
on cross examination admitted as much (Tr. p. 107). 
Plaintiff's case is based on his position there was not 
a complete settlement and he so testified. 
Obviously the fact that defendant issued two 
receipts rather than one (Tr. pp. 106-107) indicates 
tha~ defendant was not intending a full settlement 
by either receipt, otherwise he would have issued 
but one receipt. 
4. TJ-IERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AS TO 
THE VALUE OF AND GOOD WILL OF 
TI-IE BUSINESS. 
The defendant advised the plaintiff that the 
business \Yas worth $10,000.00 more than when 
opened (Tr. p. 67). Plaintiff testified as to the net 
profits the business was realizing and which aver-
aged over the tvvo months operations, December 13, 
1947, to February 12, 1 94·8, in excess of $750.00 per 
month (Tr. p. 147). The plaintiff had also worked 
for five vveeks from eight to tvvelve hours per day 
putting the premises in condition prior to opening 
business CTr. p. 137). 
Josephine Bowen testified that she had been in 
th(' Horseshoe Inn almost every night during the 
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period of the partnership (Tr. p. 12-1,), that there 
\Yere about t\Yenty-five stools in the establishment 
and the place \Yas full (Tr. p. 124). and that cus-
tomers were coming and going CTr. p. 127). She 
\Yas familiar \Yith the operations of beer taverns 
since she worked for her uncle, Jack's Place, located 
a fe\Y doors to the south of I-Iorseshoe Inn (Tr. pp. 
121, 12·)). 
Mary Sa\Yaya~ who O\'vned and operated Sa-
waya Inn, considered a draft beer license valuable 
(Tr. p. 156). The draft beer license was applied for 
and issued in plaintiff's name (Tr. p. 98). 
John B. Fairbanks, defendant's '''itness, testified 
the customers were heavy in the Horseshoe Inn on 
Ne\Y Year's Eve (Tr. p. 164). 
Reed Van Quill, bar tender by occupation, testi-
fied he had been in the Horseshoe Inn between De-
cember 12, 1947, and February 12, 1948, had ob-
served the business and that the place was busy (Tr. 
p. 167). He further testified that beginning June 5, 
1948, to September 4, 1948., he vvas employed in the 
Horseshoe Inn as bar tender for the defendant and 
that it "'as his observation that the business was 
about the same during his employment as bet"'een 
December 12, 1947, and February 12, 1948 (Tr. pp. 
169-172)~ and that he was paid wages and commis-
sions totaling $100.00 per \'veek by the defendant. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
His wages were but $10.00 per shift and his commis-
sions made up the balance (Tr. p. 170), which re-
flects that the volume of business was considerable. 
It was no wonder that the defendant wanted to dis-
solve partnership and keep all the profits himself 
considering the business could afford to pay the bar 
tender $100.00 per week. Mr. Van Quill further 
testified the gross receipts were $75.00 per day (Tr. 
p. 174) and that the net profit was about $350.00 
per week (Tr. p. 175) and throughout his testimony 
went into detail as to the source of the business re-
ceipts. Among other items sold, he testified that an 
average of tvvo kegs of beer were sold per day and 
_that Mr. Ostoich, defendant, had shown him set up 
for that quantity (Tr. p. 180). 
Samuel L. Tedesco, real estate salesman for 
Brockbank Realty and at one time manager of four 
beer parlors, testified the value of the going business 
was in his opinion in the sum of $6500.00 (Tr. p. 
188). 
1-Iarold Leonard, defendant's expert on values, 
testified after laying a foundation for his opinion 
that the value of the good will of the business alone 
was in the sum of $1,000.00 (Tr. p. 206). 
As before mentioned, there is no advantage to 
defendant in his contention that plaintiff di'd not own 
a lease,. since defendant owned the premises anrl 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1.~ 
there is no dispute but that th(' defendant continued 
to operate the identical business at the same location 
and under the name of Horseshoe Inn after February 
12~ 1948, and presumabl)· is still doing so and pro-
fiting from plaintiff's undistributed interest th('rein. 
·). THE COURT'S FINDING NlJMBER 4 IS 
DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court \Yas entitled to take into con-
sideration all of the testimony on value of the busi-
ness and good ·will, \vhich testimony has been here-
tofore reviewed in finding what the value was and 
in this connection, there 'vas substantial evidence on 
value as appears from the testimony of the witnesses 
heretofore sumn1arized. All that is required to sus-
tain the court's finding is that it be sustained by sub-
stantial evidence. Dee v. San Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. 
Co., 50 Utah 77; 167 Pac. 246, at page 252. It is 
true that not one witness testified that the value of 
the business as such, exclusive of furniture and fix-
tures, etc., was in the exact sum of $1600.00, but 
some testified the value was more than that sum 
and defendant's own expert, :Harold Leonard, testi-
fied it was in the sum of $1000.00. 
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14 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WENDELL C. DAY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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